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1 Introduction
State transfers in Italy account to as much as one third of the ﬁnancial needs of munici-
pal administrations, and their allocation is understandably a matter of intense discussion
and negotiation. Even in presence of objective criteria established by law, elected repre-
sentatives may have incentives to divert resources towards speciﬁc targets for electoral or
partisan or other reasons - a practice known as pork-barrel.
In this paper we study whether members of the Italian Parliament aﬀect the allocation
of transfers for the funding of municipal governments to favor their birth towns. In addition
to documenting this fact, our main contribution is to separate the roles of re-election
and personal incentives as its possible drivers. To this aim, we use a panel of Italian
municipalities for years 1994 to 2006 and data on personal characteristics of members of
the Camera and Senato.
After the 1994 reform, Italy moved to a single-member district (SMD) system which
stayed in place for the subsequent three elections.1 It is well known that Members of
Parliament in majoritarian systems are typically re-elected within the same district, thus
electoral incentives are highly localized. We use this observation to separate re-election
incentives from a politician's personal or career motives in the allocation of pork barrel.
A politician who is elected in a district that does not include her birth town (an external
politician) has, in principle, no direct electoral incentives to divert transfers home, as her
electoral base is elsewhere.
Our results indicate that the amount of transfers received by a municipality increases
when it becomes the birthplace of one of the national legislators. This eﬀect is mainly
driven by external legislators. We propose an explanation to our results based on post-
congressional career concerns.
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) elegantly formalize how personal incentives may
induce politicians to choose Pareto ineﬃcient policies which target their constituency over
others. The ineﬃciency arises because elected oﬃcials do not internalize the welfare losses
caused by the tax imposed on other constituencies.
On the empirical side, many authors have explored how electoral incentives are of-
ten behind distributional policies. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) show that
policymaking is diﬀerent under proportional and majoritarian systems. Under a propor-
tional system, representatives have incentives to target large parts of the electorate (social
constituencies), while majoritarian elected oﬃcials will concentrate in localized spending.
Aidt and Shvets (2012) investigate to what extent reelection concerns matter for pork-
barreling and whether they help promote socially desirable outcomes by using data on
individual legislators for the US.
But is distributional policy all about electoral concerns? Under the seminal conceptu-
alization of politicians in Downs (1957) this is indeed the case. But we know politicians'
1To be precise, the system, promptly baptized "Minotaur" for its dual nature, prescribed that three
quarters of the seats were to be allocated by majoritarian (SMD) system and one quarter by proportional.
We will take this into account in the analysis.
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decisions may be also aﬀected by their eﬀects on income, the perks of power, preferences
or other personal traits. Merlo et al. (2008), for instance, models politicians as caring both
about reelection and outside options in the form of potential public and private sector
wages. In Wittman (1983) politicians have policy preferences in addition to caring about
winning and this pulls proposed policies away from those predicted by the main voter
theorem. In an empirical study, Washington (2008) documents that members of the US
congress change voting patterns on gender sensitive issues depending on the gender com-
position of their oﬀspring. In sum, there is scope for behavioral explanations of politicians'
actions beyond those given by election incentives.
In our study of pork-barrel the challenge lies in ﬁnding an empirical strategy which
allows to distinguish the type of incentives at play. For this purpose we use the fact that
in majoritarian systems reelection eﬀorts are geographically concentrated. Members of
Parliament who retain their position after a change in legislature typically do so at their
original district of election. To use this intuition in our analysis we restrict our sample to
the majoritarian legislatures in Italian politics, between 1994 and 2006.
We deﬁne a municipality as connected if a member of Parliament was born there, and
distinguish between external and internal connections. A municipality has an internal con-
nection when it is the birth town of the legislator representing the municipality's electoral
district in the national parliament. Conversely, it has an external connection when it is the
birth town of a legislator representing some other district. Under a majoritarian system,
external legislators should have no immediate reelection incentives to send pork to their
home town. In the case of internal members of parliament electoral incentives may have
an eﬀect although whether they foster or hinder pork barrel is not clear a priori.
Our results indicate that externally connected towns receive, on average, around 2
percent higher yearly transfers per capita relative to the 2005 median. The eﬀect is robust
to introducing municipality-level ﬁxed eﬀects and to a series of robustness checks and
placebos. While the exact ﬁgure changes, the result is conﬁrmed in all speciﬁcations.
In the case in which extra transfers are a way for politicians to give back a favor or
to pave the way for a future comeback as a mayor, we should observe a positive eﬀect for
both internal and external connections. Perhaps surprisingly, however, we do not ﬁnd an
eﬀect for municipalities that have an internal connection.
This can be interpreted as evidence that, for internal legislators, electoral incentives
actually play a negative role at the moment of favoring birth towns. Internal politicians
seeking re-election are likely to be constrained by voters' retaliation threats when distribut-
ing pork: favoring one town over others may decrease support in the next election.
This interpretation is also consistent with the ﬁnding that birth towns of internal
politicians who were elected by a large margin (and hence are feel ex ante more likely to
be reelected) do receive larger transfers.
To further extend our analysis, we ask the question whether there are members of the
Parliament who have a prominent role in shaping budgetary allocations. Party leaders and
notable members weigh more at the moment of deciding budget allocations, discussing
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bills and proposing reforms. In this respect, being member of one of the key commission
in the Parliament is particularly important. We try to capture this diﬀerence in inﬂuence
by creating an indicator for being member of a key commission and interact it with our
internal and external connection variables. Results suggest that it is indeed the members of
commissions that divert transfers to hometown, a result which is consistent with intuition
and serves as validation to our methodology.
Finally, we propose an explanation for our ﬁndings based on the post-congressional
careers of Italian legislators. A career in Parliament is not the only goal of a politician.
Indeed, while being a member of one of the Chambers is the highest achievement for most,
it is generally not the last. Many former representatives continue participating in public
matters at a local level by, for example, seeking a position as a town mayor or a regional
representatives. We argue that post-congressional careers play an important role in shaping
legislators' decisions regarding state money's allocation and provide the main explanation
behind our results.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we describe the Italian institutional
context during our sample period and why it is adequate to the study of our question.
In section 3 we present the data. In section 4 we conduct our empirical analyses, while
we run some placebos and robustness checks in section 5. Finally, section 6 presents our
hypothesis that post-congressional careers are driving our results and 7 concludes with
some remarks.
2 Background
The Italian institutional setting
Italy is divided into 20 administrative regions, ﬁve of which are granted special powers due
to their peculiar nature: Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia (which
are all bordering foreign countries and are home to important language minorities) and
the two islands, Sardegna and Sicilia. Each region is divided into several provinces (110 in
total), as detailed in ﬁgure I. Provinces are in turn divided into municipalities (comuni)
totaling 8109 (as of 2010). Municipal governments receive both state and regional transfers,
and also enjoy revenues from tax collection, building permits, provision of public services,
fees, etc.
For what concerns us here, some important laws aﬀecting electoral rules and regulating
municipal ﬁnancing were enacted in the years between 1992 and 2006: the two electoral
laws approved in 1993 and 2005, and the laws regulating the way public transfers are
allocated to municipalities.
The electoral laws The Italian lower house, (Camera dei Deputati) is composed of 630
elected representatives, while the Senate (Senato) is smaller, with 315 members. In 1993
the Italian electoral system switched from open-list proportional to a mixed system: 3/4 of
the seats were assigned in single member districts, and the remaining 1/4 by a proportional
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Figure I
Italy's regions (in bold) and provinces.
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system.2 A total of 475 members of the Camera and 232 senators were therefore elected
through the majoritarian system. This setup was used to determine the composition of the
two chambers of the Italian Parliament for the elections of 1994, 1996 and 2001. In 2005 a
new law modiﬁed the system switching to a closed-list proportional representation system,
under which the last elections of 2006 and 2008 took place. We concentrate on the years
1994-2006 in which the majoritarian (single member district) system was in place. Cotta
and Verzichelli (2007) argue that the shift to an single-member district system made the
personal proﬁles of individual Italian politicians more important, an aspect that we will
investigate further in the following of the paper.
Main laws regulating transfers to municipalities and regions Municipalities
are funded mainly through three channels: state or region transfers, tax revenues and non-
tax revenues (revenues from public services or participation in societies etc.).
For what regards state transfers, in 1992 a comprehensive law was approved regulating
state transfers to regions and municipalities, based on objective criteria and on fairness
considerations. Although the speciﬁcs varied over the years, the basic rules remained sub-
stantially unchanged during the period 1992-2005. State transfers are in part automatically
determined, in order to cover ordinary running costs, on the basis of municipality's pop-
ulation, surface and density, age composition, previous expenses and the presence or not
of a military base. Another part is meant to cover expenses for "public works of major
socioeconomic interest" and to foster convergence of under-endowed municipalities to the
national average, and is naturally subject to greater discretionality.
While those criteria specify the guidelines for determining the amount of transfers, the
approval of the eﬀective allocations and their total amount is done through the budget law,
approved by the Parliament in the last days of December each year. Such law determines
in detail how and where the public spending goes, and is a central topic that occupies both
the parliamentary and the public debate during the whole time between discussion and
approval.
The law classiﬁes transfers into current transfers, that are intended to cover basic
running costs and capital transfers, destined to ﬁnance investments. Current transfers
can be further decomposed into i) ordinary transfers, to cover basic expenses such as
personnel, public transportation, maintenance of roads and buildings, etc. ii) transfers
established by special laws and ﬁnally iii) a convergence fund, to bridge diﬀerences in
endowments between municipalities.3 Capital transfers are divided into i) ordinary capital
transfers, ii) special capital transfers and iii) past mortgages payments.4 We here and
henceforth refer to transfers or transfersit for municipality i and period t, as the per
capita amount of all state transfers to that municipality in a given year excluding past
2Its ambivalent nature earned the system the nickname "Minotaur".
3These are called, in the laws, fondo ordinario, fondo consolidato and fondo perequativo respec-
tively.
4 These are the contributo nazionale ordinario investimenti, contributo fondo speciale investimenti
and contributo sviluppo investimenti respectively.
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Figure II
Evolution of state transfers in Italy, by category.
Source: Data from the Ministry for Internal Aﬀairs.
mortgage payments. The rationale for removing past mortgages payments is that those
quantities were established under the previous legislative regime, in place before 1992.
After 1992, remaining due payments kept ﬂowing to municipalities, but such quantities
were not manipulable anymore, nor new mortgages could be signed.
In 2001, a Constitutional reform took place and municipalities, provinces and regions
began to enjoy more ﬁnancial and political autonomy. For what concerns the scope of
this paper, the most relevant change was that after municipalities and regions receive a
fraction of the tax income collected by the central government. This additional transfers
were oﬀset by a similar reduction in the ordinary transfers, as one can appreciate in ﬁgure
III. Incidentally we notice that, although one of 2001 reform's objective was to improve
regions and municipalities' economic independence from the state, the total amount of
transfers from the central government did not decrease substantially: in 2008, 7 years after
the decentralizing reform, the central government transfers continued to represent over
50% of municipal revenues (Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Cerniglia (2008)).
3 Data
We construct a unique dataset by combining diﬀerent sources, on i) state transfers to
municipalities, ii) elected representatives and iii) geographical and economic controls.
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Transfers to municipalities
The transfer of State resources to municipalities is competence of the Italian Ministry of
Internal Aﬀairs, and disaggregated data are available, for each of the 8,109 municipalities
and for the period of interest, at the Ministry's website.5
Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli are special autonomous regions and are ex-
cluded from the analysis since they lie outside the normal competence of the State. This
leaves us with a dataset of 15 ordinary regions, containing a total of 7,476 comuni, for each
year from 1994 to 2006.
The total amount of central government resources to be transferred to the comuni
in the following year is determined by the end of each year in the budget law. A large
part of those funds are eﬀectively payed, as scheduled, during the following year, and the
remaining is generally settled within two additional years.
Looking at the distribution of transfers at the municipality level quickly reveals sub-
stantial heterogeneity, even in per capita terms. In ﬁgure III we plot on a map the total
state transfers in per capita terms for 1996, for each of the 8,109 comuni (classes are delim-
ited by quintiles). Notice that municipalities in mountainous and southern areas appear
to receive more money per capita, while in the north and especially in the river Po valley
transfers are lower. Determinants of this heterogeneity are in large part population density
and economic development diﬀerences, and some areas also beneﬁt from higher beneﬁts
to cover costs for national interest infrastructures. The light areas in the north-west and
in the north-east are Valle d'Aosta, Trentino and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, three autonomous
regions that we drop from the sample as they receive almost no direct transfers.
Data on representatives
We combine data on transfers with information about members of the national Parliament
for the 1994-2006 period. Data for the lower house are obtained from the archive of the
Camera while for senators we turn to the Senato historical website.6
We complement this data with information on representatives elected at regional (rather
than national) legislative bodies. The Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs provides historical data
on anyone who has been elected for public oﬃce in Italy since uniﬁcation, including date
and place of birth, party membership, education and other basic personal characteristics.
From this source we obtain data on all elected representatives for the regional Parliaments
for each of the 18 regions in our sample.
Data on government coalitions complete our ﬁrst dataset: for each municipality and
for each year we have the number of representatives at the national Parliament or at
any regional Parliament that were born there, as well as personal characteristics of these
representatives including their party. Personal characteristics of politicians are obtained
from the dataset assembled by Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni (2010).
5www.interno.it
6http://storia.camera.it/ and http://www.senato.it/legislature/297885/sitostorico.htm
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Figure III
Total state transfers by municipality of origin, Legislature XIII.
Source: Data from the Ministry for Internal Aﬀairs.
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In ﬁgure IV we show the geographic distribution of national legislators' birthplaces.
one can notice that a large number is from the capital, Rome, and, not surprisingly, from
other large cities like Turin, Milan, Genoa, Naples, etc.
Economic and geographical controls
Geographical, demographic and economic characteristics of municipalities are important
determinants of the amount of transfers the state decides to allocate (some of them are
explicitly indicated in the law, as we saw before). For this reason we gather data on popu-
lation from the Italian Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT), surface of the municipality and presence
of military bases, together with geographical data on maximum and minimum altitude as
well as geographic coordinates taken from the Italian Agency for Energy (ENEA).
Descriptive Statistics
Table I presents a series of characteristics of Italian municipalities, grouped by election
(each column corresponds to the average across the respective election period). Municipal-
ities are smaller in the north of Italy, with an average population of about 5,300, and larger
in the center-south, while the average surface is 33.88 km2 and density is about 291 inhabi-
tants per km2. Total transfers per capita are higher in the south (285 euros per year in the
1994-1995 period) and in the center(224, against the 182 in the North) and decreased after
2001. This is due to the 2001 reform, as noted in section 2. Having a home born politician
in Parliament is more common for southern and central municipalities (about 8 percent
of the southern municipalities are birth towns of a member of the national Parliament).
Among municipalities having a local elected as a national legislator, the average number of
representatives per town ranges from about 1.5 in the south to 1.6-2 in the north. Finally,
as of 2010, Italy had 110 provinces and 8,094 municipalities. After excluding three special
regions from the sample, we are left with 7,476 municipalities for estimation purposes.
In Table II, instead, we report some characteristics of the members of the Italian Parlia-
ment, taken in part from the the dataset build by Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni
(2010). Members of the Camera are in general younger than their colleagues in Senato
(50.4 versus 55 years old in 2001), and slightly less educated, with a higher percentage
holding a degree or MA/PhD. Regarding their political career, we observe that politicians
from the two chambers are comparable in tenure in Parliament and that the 2001 Parlia-
ment is by far the most experienced (about 4.4 years of tenure on average). We can also
notice that politicians held previous party appointments twenty to forty percent of the
times, depending on the term, either at the local or at the national level. Finally, more
than half of senators had previous political experience at the local level, the percentage
being only slightly lower for members of the lower house.
The second panel of Table II shows that, for what regards representatives elected
through the uninominal system, about half were elected in the district that includes his or
her birth town, while the remaining half were elected in district.
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Figure IV
Representatives by municipality of origin, Legislature XIII.
Source: Data from the Ministry for Internal Aﬀairs.
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Table I
Descriptives - Municipalities
Election
1994 1996 2001
North 5,375 5,399 5,482
[32,379] [30,688] [29,763]
Population mean [std. dev.] Center 9,100 9,144 9,175
[33,384] [32,930] [32,253]
South 8,929 8,952 8,979
[33,164] [31,808] [31,808]
Surface (km2) 37.1
[51.5]
Density (inh/km2) mean [std. dev.] 291.1
[647.3]
North 182 163 229
[205] [99] [125]
Total transfers per capita mean [std. dev.] Center 224 214 248
[121] [125] [138]
South 285 279 280
[104] [108] [122]
North 3.2 3.6 3.4
% of munic. with one repr. mean Center 6.1 6 6.3
South 8.6 7.7 7.8
North 2 1.6 1.6
Avg. number of repr. mean Center 1.7 1.8 1.7
South 1.4 1.5 1.6
N of Municipalities 7476
N of Province Capitals 110
N of Munic. with at least one rep. 408 405 405
Note: the number of municipalities and of province capitals refers to 2005.
Total transfers per capita are in 2005 euros.
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Table II
Descriptives - Parliament members
Senato Camera
1994 1996 2001 1994 1996 2001
Personal characteristics
Age (years) 53.4 54.0 55.0 47.0 48.2 50.4
[8.3] [8.0] [7.9] [9.9] [9.4] [9.2]
Primary (%) 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
Lower secundary educ. (%) 1.6 2.9 1.3 1.6 0.8 1.1
Upper secundary educ. (%) 21.3 18.8 20.5 29.7 28.1 27.2
Degree (%) 61.2 63.1 65.5 58.6 57.6 62.7
MA/PhD (%) 11.5 10.5 7.0 9.9 9.4 8.6
Missing (%) 4.5 4.6 5.4 0.3 4.1 0.2
Political career
Years in Parliament 2.3 2.7 4.4 1.9 2.6 4.3
[4.5] [4.2] [5.2] [4.6] [4.7] [5.4]
Previously appointed in national party (%) 19.4 27.1 35.4 23.5 32.8 41.3
[0.4] [0.4] [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4]
Previously appointed in local party (%) 23.2 24.2 18.5 20.0 26.8 21.1
[0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4]
Previous political exp. at the local level (%) 56.4 54.7 64.2 47.1 49.8 59.5
[0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.4]
Observations 314 314 313 630 630 617
Uninominal representatives
Elected in the same district as birthtown (%) 49.6 56.3 56.5 49.9 53.1 55.6
Elected in another district (%) 50.4 43.7 43.5 50.1 46.9 44.4
Observations 230 231 232 475 475 476
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4 Empirical Analysis
The objective of this section is to empirically assess whether and in which way members
of Parliament target their birth towns with public transfers for reasons other than gaining
votes for future re-election. To this aim, we compare connected towns with unconnected
towns.
A municipality is connected if it is the birth town of at least one member of the national
Parliament ("MP") in a given year. We split those connection in two categories: if the
MP was elected in a constituency that includes her birth town, we say that the town has
an "internal connection". If, on the contrary, she was elected in a constituency that does
not include her birth town, the town has an "external connection". For a municipality i
and a year t, we then deﬁne the two dummies ext. connectit and int. connectit which take
value one if the town is connected according to these deﬁnitions and zero otherwise. We
separately also identify towns which are birth towns of MPs elected in the proportional
system by means of the variable prop. connectit. Our dependent variable is municipal
transfers per capita received by a municipality in a year.
The rationale for separating the political connection in three groups comes from a
concern about diﬀerences in incentives: theory suggests that politicians elected under a
proportional system have incentives to target either party strongholds or party leader baili-
wicks (Golden and Picci, 2008), while under a majoritarian single-member district system,
politicians' personal proﬁle and popularity acquire greater importance. In particular, re-
election concerns may induce her to speciﬁcally target her constituency ("pork-barreling").
By isolating politicians who were elected outside the constituency where they were born,
we aim to identify purely personal, non-electoral interests.
The use of birth place as a link between a legislator and a speciﬁc town is motivated
by the idea that legislators retain links with their towns of birth throughout their lives
and may know local politicians (Marangoni and Tronconi, 2011). Moreover, given that
birthplaces are public information, the politician can arguably use this to claim credit for
the increase in transfers of funds to her hometown.
Before proceeding to our econometric analysis, we show in ﬁgure V the diﬀerences in the
mean transfers per capita received by connected (either external, internal or proportional)
and unconnected town for each of the legislatures in our 1994-2006 sample. The pattern
is clear, connected towns receive higher transfers per capita in all legislatures and all
population groups.7
7We exclude towns with populations under 500 from this graph because almost none of them has a
connection.
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Figure V
Avereage Transfers per capita by population for all elections
Notes: In each of the three panels, the bins are the average transfers p.c. received by municipalities
which are (column Y) or are not birth towns of a member of the Parliament (column N). From left to
right we report results for diﬀerent population bands. Figures are in 2005 euros.
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4.1 Baseline Results
In our baseline speciﬁcation we consider a regression of transfers per capita transfersit
on the ﬁrst lag of the three connection dummies (recall connectit−1) taking value 1 if
municipality i enjoys a connection with Parliament as deﬁned above and 0 otherwise. This
is expressed as
transfersit = β1ext. connectit−1 + β2int. connectit−1 + β3prop. connectit−1 + δ′xit + uit,
(1)
where the coeﬃcient of interest, β1, measures the extra yearly transfers per capita that a
municipality receives on average for having an external representative at the Parliament. β2
and β3, instead, capture the eﬀect for internal and proportional representative, respectively.
We use the lag instead of the contemporaneous variable because transfers for the following
calendar year are approved at the end of December. As usual, xit is a vector of controls,
δ is a conformable vector of parameters and uit is a random disturbance term assumed to
be uncorrelated with our variable of interest. The choice of controls is partly driven by the
criteria for allocation of transfers to municipalities contained in the 1992 law we described
in section 2. In particular, we include a third degree polynomial in lagged population,
lagged population density, surface in hundreds of square hectometers, a dummy taking
value one if the municipality has a military base and a dummy taking value one if the
municipality is a province. We also include a series of lagged population group dummies,
again following the 1992 law. Besides this, some speciﬁcations include year, region or year-
region dummies in order to capture ﬁxed regional heterogeneity (e.g.: diﬀerences between
southern and northern regions) as well as diﬀerences in business or political cycles.
Results for the estimation of these speciﬁcations are presented in table III. In columns
1 to 4 we present speciﬁcations with diﬀerent selections of time and geographical dummies.
Column 1 reports OLS estimates for model 1 with year, region and year-region interacting
dummies.
One concern regarding the interpretation of the coeﬃcients in column 1 is that certain
towns may have unobserved characteristics which inﬂuence transfers and are correlated
with the probability of enjoying a legislative connection. Indeed, looking at ﬁgure III one
can see that internal and southern municipalities, which are generally poorer than the
average, receive higher transfers per capita. It is possible that poor economic conditions
may provide extra incentives to enter a career in politics, because of lack of interesting
outside options in the private sector. In this case, poorer municipalities will also be more
likely to have more politicians and to receive more transfers. Omitting from the regression
a variable that measures the economic conditions at the municipality level would therefore
lead to an omitted variable bias.
One way to address this problem is to take advantage of the longitudinal nature of our
data and control for unobserved heterogeneity at the municipality level using ﬁxed eﬀects.
Results for the within group estimator (s.e. are clustered at the municipality level) are
presented in column 2-4, with diﬀerent sets of time and region dummies. Naturally, all
time invariant variables (including region eﬀects) are subsumed into the ﬁxed eﬀect and,
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hence, excluded from the estimation.
One potential issue with using the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator in this context is the fact
that the connectit−1 variables exhibits scarce longitudinal variation in the majority of
municipalities. This is a consequence of two combined factors. In the ﬁrst place, in the
1996 and 2001 elections over 60% of all legislators were reelected. Secondly, all relatively
large cities such as Rome, Milan or Naples, connectedit−1 will exhibit no time variation as
they are always connected, while the converse will happen with the vast majority of small
towns, which never are. Estimation results, however, show a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of having a connection on transfers.8
While the estimated coeﬃcient of having an external coeﬃcient is statistically sig-
niﬁcant in all speciﬁcation, its magnitude passes from 10.39 to about 4.6 once we include
municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, suggesting that indeed unobserved town-level characteristics play
a role. For this reason, we concentrate on results in column 4, which include the richest
set of ﬁxed eﬀects: year, year-region interactions and municipality ﬁxed eﬀects. Having a
connection in Parliament therefore increases yearly per capita transfers to a municipality
by roughly 4.1 euros on average. This amounts to about 1.8% of the overall sample mean
and 2.1% of the sample median in 2005, corresponding to a 2 million euros increase in
transfers over a full legislature for a middle sized province capital.9
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that that neither having an internal nor a proportional politi-
cian in the Parliament aﬀects transfers to municipalities: the coeﬃcient for the internal
connection is around zero while the one for proportional is about 3.3 but imprecisely esti-
mated (this may be due to the fact that only one quarter of the Parliament is elected in
the proportional quota). We will come back to these results later.
The other estimated coeﬃcients reveal that being a province capital has no signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on transfers, while higher density and surface area are associated with higher
allocations.
4.2 Internals and externals: incentives
Imagine that a politician cares about rents from oﬃce but that electors, instead, expect
her to provide a public good and will punish rent-seeking. In our setup, those rents are
represented by funds for the hometown, while the public good is transfers to constituencies.
The politician has to choose how to split the funds between transfers to constituency and
rents, and she knows that, if caught securing rents, she will not be re-elected.
It is reasonable to think that voters are more likely to catch an internal rather than
an external diverting funds home, just because the hometown of an internal lies inside the
constituency of election. As a consequence, we expect that externals are able to secure
8Some cities are so large that were divided into several constituencies, so that deﬁning an external con-
nection in such cases is potentially troublesome. We address this issue by collapsing multiple constituencies
into one, corresponding to the city boundaries. As a robustness check, we also run all estimations again
by dropping all multi-constituency cities, and results are unaﬀected.
9These calculations are for a 100,000 inhabitants city, such as Trento or Novara.
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Table III
Baseline Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
ext. connect t-1 9.519∗∗∗ 6.098∗∗∗ 5.150∗∗ 4.146∗∗
(3.464) (2.052) (2.140) (1.907)
int. connect t-1 2.587 -1.108 -0.614 0.0594
(2.986) (2.318) (2.507) (2.213)
prop. connect t-1 5.167 4.037 4.007 2.925
(3.799) (2.804) (2.936) (2.682)
winning_share_lag 0.672 52.90∗∗∗ 24.15∗∗∗ 4.836
(2.840) (1.691) (2.110) (3.104)
Pop. density t-1 0.633∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗ 0.778 -0.0733
(0.155) (0.606) (0.551) (0.565)
Surface area in km2 1.942∗∗∗
(0.239)
Province capital 8.749
(9.837)
Year Eﬀects Y N Y Y
Region Eﬀects Y N N N
Year*Region Eﬀects N N N Y
Municipality F.E. N Y Y Y
R2 0.499 0.0181 0.112 0.185
Obs. 89164 89164 89164 89164
Standard errors in parentheses
S.E. clustered at the municipality level.
Dep. variable is transfers per capita excluding payment for previous mortgage obligations
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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more rents while internals, as long as electoral retaliation is a threat, will opt for providing
relatively more public good instead.
We can test these two implications with data. To this aim, we ﬁrst deﬁne a dummy
that equals one if the elected politician won the district by a margin larger than 10 percent
over the second. Then, we interact this indicator with int.connect and ext.connect. The
coeﬃcient of those interactions intends to capture the extra eﬀect of having a "safe seat"
and therefore lower electoral concerns on the decision of sending rents home.
Results in table IV show that hometowns of internal politicians who won the election by
a relatively high margin are associated with, on average, 5.9 extra transfers per capita each
year, while this is not the case for external ones.10 External politicians, in fact, are subject
to looser electoral control by voters at the time of sending money home, since their birth
town is outside their constituency of election. Internal politicians, on the contrary, may
ﬁnd hard to favor one town over another without being noticed by the local electorate. This
line of thought is consistent with ﬁnding a large and positive eﬀect of internals politicians
that won by a large margin and no eﬀect for the corresponding externals.
To further investigate the eﬀects of those diﬀerences in electoral threats for internals and
externals, we aggregate transfers at the constituency level and run a regression (controls
and time plus region-time dummies are included as before, and standard errors are clustered
at the constituency level) of transfers per capita on an indicator which equals one if the
constituency is represented by an external MP. Each constituency can be represented by
either an internal or an external (or by someone born abroad) politician, so the coeﬃcient
of this indicator can be interpreted as the conditional eﬀect of having elected an external.
Transfers p.c.
ext. connect t-1 -950.0∗∗∗
[356.0]
prop. connect t-1 235.9
[270.5]
Year Eﬀects Y
Region Eﬀects Y
Year*Region Eﬀects Y
Sample mean 4557.2
R2 0.409
Obs. 4452
S.E. clustered at the constituency level.
We see by the results in table V that indeed districts represented by external receive
less transfers for an estimated coeﬃcient of -950 euros per capita per year, suggesting that
externals are substituting the public good with rents.
10We have also tried to change the threshold to 5, 15 and 20 percent and results are qualitatively similar,
with coeﬃcients of the internal interaction ranging from 6.2 to 12.4 (signiﬁcant at 5 percent) while the
coeﬃcient of external interaction remains indistinguishable form zero.
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Table IV
Including margin of victory interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
ext. connect t-1 8.399∗∗ 7.017∗∗∗ 4.610∗ 3.189
(4.020) (2.417) (2.575) (2.233)
int. connect t-1 0.790 -2.308 -3.174 -3.387
(3.423) (2.268) (2.493) (2.144)
prop. connect t-1 5.326 4.022 4.130
(3.814) (2.819) (2.951)
ext. conn. * margin>10 3.075 -2.686 2.030 2.322
(6.099) (2.962) (3.024) (2.434)
int. conn. * margin>10 6.670 4.831 10.10∗ 12.63∗∗
(6.219) (5.783) (5.849) (5.341)
winning_share_lag 0.527 52.84∗∗∗ 23.94∗∗∗ 4.656
(2.847) (1.693) (2.117) (3.106)
Pop. density t-1 0.635∗∗∗ 1.369∗∗ 0.802 -0.0411
(0.155) (0.607) (0.549) (0.564)
Surface area in km2 1.945∗∗∗
(0.238)
Province capital 8.494
(9.790)
Year Eﬀects Y N Y Y
Region Eﬀects Y N N N
Year*Region Eﬀects N N N Y
Municipality F.E. N Y Y Y
R2 0.499 0.0181 0.112 0.185
Obs. 89164 89164 89164 89164
Standard errors in parentheses
S.E. clustered at the municipality level.
Dep. variable is transfers per capita excluding payment for previous mortgage obligations
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
20
4.3 The eﬀect of powerful politicians
The results of the previous sections suggest that externally connected politicians are the
ones diverting money to their hometown, but politicians are likely to be quite heterogeneous
not only regarding experience and education, but especially in terms of political inﬂuence.
A long standing tradition in the Italian Parliamentary routine is the habit of squeezing
into the budget law (the "legge Finanziaria"), in the last moments before approval, many
little modiﬁcations, often unrelated with the main objective of the law and rather aimed at
pursuing personal interests of the legislators. Former Prime Minister Bettino Craxi used to
call it the "arraﬀa-arraﬀa" law (a possible translation is "steal as much as you can" law),
while for Massimo d'Alema, another former left-wing Prime Minister, "the Parliament
becomes the most squalid bazaar at the moment of approving the budget law".11. The
situation was so embarrassing that in 2004 the government, in order to keep local interests
outside of the budged law discussion, decided to allocate sum between 200 and 170 million
euros per year for the following years for projects proposed by representatives and aimed
at promoting the "economic and social development of the territory". The money was
then later fragmented into many small interventions at the local level, from restoring a
church to promoting a festival, etc. This mechanism was useful for politicians to achieve
recognition and popularity in their home towns and constituencies, and to strengthen
electoral consensus. Powerful politicians have more connections with the party, voters and
potentially with the government, and their stronger inﬂuence may also be reﬂected in their
success in transferring money to their hometown by exerting more pressure at the moment
of approving the law.
To empirically verify this hypothesis we proceed to merge our dataset with data by
(Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2010) in order to obtain information on mem-
bers of the Parliament's permanent commissions. Those commissions are 15 and serve as
smaller Parliaments for speciﬁc issues such as justice, defense, public budget, agriculture,
etc. Each of them is composed of about 15-27 members in the Senato and 35-90 in the
Camera which discuss and modify speciﬁc proposals. After this process, the law passes to
the Chambers for discussion and voting. These commissions have therefore a considerable
inﬂuence in shaping the legislative agenda, and their activity is naturally impulsed by the
government. It is reasonable to believe that memberships in key commissions are mainly
reserved to inﬂuential politicians, and for this reason we construct a dummy variable that
equals one if the politicians belong to a key commission and zero otherwise. By inter-
acting this variable with our connection measures, we can identify whether members of a
commission are more successful at sending money home than the others by looking at the
coeﬃcient of the interaction terms. It is not entirely clear how to select the commissions
that deal with matters related to transfers and public money from the ones that discuss
mainly technical or legislative issues. While the choice will always involve a certain de-
gree of arbitrariness, we believe that we are on the safe side excluding the constitutional
aﬀairs, the foreign aﬀairs, the European Union and the defense commissions. Even casual
11http://tinyurl.com/bs46635
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inspection of the activity of those commissions reveals that they do not discuss anything
related to budget or the budget law. We also do not consider as key the commissions on
employment and justice, for similar reasons. Hence, we are left with public budget, public
ﬁnance, culture, public works, agriculture, industry, health, environment and transports,
which will form our "key commissions" group.
In table V we report results of the baseline model with the interaction terms. The
coeﬃcient of the interactions of internal and external connections with being member of
a key commission are 8 and 7.3, that is almost two times the baseline eﬀect of having
an (external connection) estimated in section 4.1. At the same time, the coeﬃcient for
having a connection which is not member of a commission is about zero for external, -4 for
internal and 5.3 for proportional connections (both not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero).12
In this model with interactions, the overall eﬀect of having an internal connection, either
belonging to a commission or not, is given by the sum of the coeﬃcient of int.connect and
int.connect ∗ comm.. By summing the coeﬃcients for all the three types of connections,
we see that externals are still the ones sending more money overall.
5 Placebos and Robustness checks
While our ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation may deal with time invariant unobservables, it is still
possible that identiﬁcation is threatened by time-varying shocks which aﬀect both transfers
to a municipality and the probability that politicians from that municipality run for Par-
liament. We propose some placebos for our baseline results which attempt to address these
issues by considering the eﬀect of variables which are related to the political importance
of a municipality (and, hence, also to such time varying shocks) but which, in principle,
should be unrelated to the transfers the town's municipal government receives. Results are
reported in Table VI, in which we only report results of the estimation with municipality
ﬁxed eﬀects plus time and region-time interaction dummies. In all speciﬁcations we use
the same controls as in the previous sections, and standard errors are similarly clustered
at the municipality level.
In our ﬁrst placebo we use data on candidates in national legislative elections to de-
termine the runner ups in all uninominal district votes. In a single member district, in
each election there is always a winner - who takes a seat in Parliament - and some losers.
We construct a variable false ext connectit in exactly the same way as ext connectit but
that equals one when a municipality has a runner-up rather than a winner in a uninominal
district election. The introduction of this variable is motivated by the fact that a munic-
ipality may be particularly good in training politicians, a fact that gives it an edge over
others in terms of visibility at the national political level. Such a municipality would then
have a higher probability of presenting a candidate but not necessarily of winning. If it is
12We try diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the key commissions group, for instance by removing culture, in-
dustry, health and environment, obtaining a coeﬃcient of 8.3 for the external interaction and 10.6 for the
internal interaction, signiﬁcant at the 10 and 1 percent level respectively. If we further remove agriculture
and transports, the interaction of internal and commission stops being signiﬁcant.
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Table V
Including commission interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
ext. connect t-1 10.64∗∗ 1.888 0.349 -0.308
(4.710) (2.237) (2.381) (1.662)
int. connect t-1 -0.824 -5.547 -5.068 -4.327
(4.069) (3.747) (3.948) (3.374)
prop. connect t-1 3.391 4.433 4.933 5.331
(5.355) (4.164) (4.343) (3.842)
ext. connect * comm. -0.871 6.399 7.398∗ 8.006∗∗
(5.852) (4.214) (4.335) (3.733)
int. connect * comm. 5.542 7.550∗∗ 7.174∗ 7.279∗∗
(4.907) (3.655) (3.925) (3.283)
prop. connect * comm. 2.091 -2.199 -3.260 -4.096
(6.974) (5.287) (5.479) (4.680)
Pop. density t-1 0.553∗∗∗ 0.816 -0.293 -1.393∗∗
(0.153) (0.595) (0.599) (0.637)
Surface area in km2 1.787∗∗∗
(0.228)
Province capital 15.40∗
(9.223)
Year Eﬀects Y N Y Y
Region Eﬀects Y N N N
Year*Region Eﬀects N N N Y
Municipality F.E. N Y Y Y
R2 0.498 0.0206 0.110 0.184
Obs. 89554 89554 89554 89554
Standard errors in parentheses
S.E. clustered at the municipality level.
Dep. variable is transfers per capita excluding payment for previous mortgage obligations
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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this political visibility that guarantees extra transfers and not the fact of having a connec-
tion, we should observe that having a runner-up also has a signiﬁcant impact on transfers.
The negative and statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates for false ext connectit and
false int connectit in column 1 of Table VI reassuringly suggest that this is not the case.
Following a similar intuition our second placebo uses a dummy reg connectit taking
value one if the town has a home born politician elected in a regional (as opposed to
national) Parliament. As with the previous placebo, a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient here would
point to some confounding factor driving both transfers and towns' connections as there is
no plausible way through which regional legislators may aﬀect national transfers directly.
We ﬁnd that having a regional connection, as expected, has no signiﬁcant impact on
transfers.
We then proceed to test the robustness of our section 4.1 results by including the both
the runner-up and the regional connection variables as controls in our ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁca-
tions. Results in column 3 of Table VI conﬁrm that including the "false" connections in the
regression does not alter the results, and having an external connection in the Parliament
is the only one that matters.
Finally, we also consider a placebo test in which we change the dependent variable.
We have seen in section 3 that total transfers to a municipality can be split into several
accounting concepts. One of them is "past mortgage payments", which is an accounting
device through which way municipalities were ﬁnanced before 1992. Each municipality was
allowed to take on mortgage debt which the central government assumed as its own. Each
year, the government would transfer the corresponding amount to the municipality in order
to pay the installments. This system ceased to exist in 1992, but many mortgages were still
unpaid so transfers went on for the following years and were quite sizable as shown in ﬁgure
II. Recall that our deﬁnition of transfers excludes these quantities. We now instead focus
on them and check whether having some type of connection has any eﬀect on these type
of transfers. As shown in column 4 of Table VI, having a connection of any kind has no
eﬀect at all on payments for previous mortgage obligations. The placebo and robustness
checks proposed in this section are not able, and are not meant to deﬁnitively exclude
the presence of some residual municipality-level unobservables that bias our estimates.
Nonetheless, they allow us to rule out some important alternative explanation, and in
particular the one that some municipalities are just especially good at training politicians
and at increasing their visibility in the political scenario by doing so.
6 Mechanism
The results in section 4.1 suggest that only municipalities that have an external connection
in the Parliament receive, on average, more transfers, while no extra money is diverted to
those being hometown of an internal or proportionally elected politician. There may be
diﬀerent factors behind this perhaps surprising result.
While the typical explanation for many distributional policies and pork-barrel spending
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Table VI
Placebos
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Mortgage transfers p.c.
false ext. connect t-1 -1.699 -1.333
(1.925) (1.856)
false int. connect t-1 -0.402 -0.347
(1.448) (1.449)
reg. connect t-1 0.532 0.628
(1.208) (1.212)
ext. connect t-1 4.024∗∗ -0.696
(1.843) (0.780)
int. connect t-1 0.0371 0.00915
(2.220) (0.651)
prop. connect t-1 2.859 -0.647
(2.637) (0.783)
Pop. density t-1 -0.0539 -0.0469 -0.0778 -0.568∗∗∗
(0.575) (0.574) (0.568) (0.213)
Municipality F.E. Y Y Y Y
R2 0.185 0.185 0.185 0.590
Obs. 89164 89164 89164 83852
Standard errors in parentheses
S.E. clustered at the municipality level.
Dep. variable is transfers per capita excluding payment for previous mortgage obligations except for column 4
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table VII
Post-congressional careers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c. Transfers p.c.
ext. connect t-1 8.681** 4.306* 3.225 3.668*
(3.612) (2.325) (2.406) (2.135)
int. connect t-1 3.214 -1.795 -2.242 -0.668
(3.111) (2.613) (2.772) (2.338)
prop. connect t-1 4.373 3.266 3.192 3.277
(3.702) (2.916) (3.048) (2.762)
ext. t-1 * posterior exp. 19.13* 10.55 12.15* 4.781
(10.18) (6.628) (7.069) (6.269)
int. t-1 * posterior exp. -3.543 5.159 8.732* 5.180
(6.030) (4.627) (5.032) (4.229)
Year Eﬀects Y N Y Y
Region Eﬀects Y N N Y
Year*Region Eﬀects N N N Y
Municipality F.E.
R2 0.498 0.0205 0.110 0.183
Obs. 89554 89554 89554 89554
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
S.E. clustered at the municipality level.
Dep. variable is transfers per capita excluding payment for previous mortgage obligations
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lies in reelection concerns of the politicians, by the deﬁnition of connection used in the
empirical analysis above we know that reelection concerns cannot be driving our results.
However, Merlo et al. (2008) recently stress that a large fraction of individuals who prior
to being MPs working in another sector (...) end up taking another political job after
leaving Parliament, suggesting that post-congressional career may be a relevant concern
for Italian members of Parliament. Indeed, of the members of Parliament who continue
their career in the political sector, 35.8% do so at the local level (municipality, province or
region) and 53.6% take a position in the party.
We consider that post-congressional careers may be the key to understanding the moti-
vation behind the birth town bias. By increasing transfers to their municipalities of birth,
MPs increase the value of their outside option in case they fail to get reelected.
By transferring more funds to their home town, the politician could be able to increase
not only the present budget but the future budget. If the politician expects that it is likely
that she may end up as mayor or member of the government of her birth town and the value
of this job is related to the town budget (empire building), then there is a clear incentive
to make eﬀorts to increase transfers to the town as long as this generates a persistent
increase in the budget. In order to test this hypothesis, we construct interactions between
the internal and external connection dummies and the fraction of legislators who later took
up a position at the local level after exiting Parliament. We then include this interaction
in our baseline regression and test for the signiﬁcance of the corresponding coeﬃcient.
Data on post-congressional careers are obtaining by extending our sample to 2012 with
data on election at all local levels (municipality, province and region) from the Ministry
for Internal Aﬀairs website. In Table VII we can notice that the eﬀect of politicians who,
after Parliament, picked up a position at the local level seem to be stronger. However,
possibly also because of the small variation in the data, the coeﬃcients are not always
statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, in column 3 and four we observe that the coeﬃcient
for an internal connection (interacted with posterior experience) is larger than the one for
the external connection.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we present evidence showing that having a home born representative in
Parliament can increase transfers to a given municipality even if that representative has no
direct electoral incentive to engage in pork-barreling. We estimate this eﬀect to be around
2.1% of the 2005 median of per capita transfers. This eﬀect is double if we concentrate on
members of parliamentary commissions. We ﬁnd no eﬀect for politicians that were elected
in the proportional system.
Results are robust to the inclusion of ﬁxed unobserved heterogeneity at the town level
and to a series of placebo and robustness checks.
Internal and external politicians have diﬀerent incentives at the moment of deciding
between securing rents for themselves (or, in this case, for their hometown) and providing
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public goods. It is reasonable to think that voters are more likely to catch an internal
rather than an external diverting funds home, just because the hometown of an internal
lies inside the constituency of election. As a consequence, we expect that externals are
able to secure more rents while internals, as long as electoral retaliation is a threat, will
opt for providing the public good instead. We test these two implications with the data
and we ﬁnd support for both: in particular, we aggregate transfers by constituency and
ﬁnd that those which are represented by externals receive, on average, substantially less
transfers than those which elected an internal. Also, we show that internal politicians who
won the election by a large margin over the second are associated with signiﬁcantly larger
transfer to their hometown, while for externals this is not the case.
We propose a simple explanation for our ﬁnding that representatives favor their home-
town. We ﬁnd some evidence on the fact that politicians that later pick up a position in
a local-level government body (for instance, mayors) are the ones diverting more transfers
to their hometown, although the limited time variation in our data do not always allow us
to precisely estimate the eﬀect.
Our result has both behavioral and welfare implications. On the behavioral side, our
results underscore that, while reelection incentives may be important, in some contexts it
may be useful to consider other kinds of personal (in this case, post-congressional career)
motivations. On the welfare side, the results have implications on the eﬃciency of the
resource allocation process between municipalities. Considering that the eﬀect is calculated
as an average over all representatives we may conclude that the total size of the distortion
may amount to several million euros per legislature.
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